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FRENCH REPORT: The Freedom of conscience in the French Law, BLANDINE 
CHELINI-PONT, Université PAUL CEZANNE, AIX-MARSEILLE  
"You never will touch with too much scruple on this delicate and sacred thing, consciousness of a 
child", Jules Ferry, President of the French Government and Head of Public Education, Letter to the 
Teachers, November 27, 1883. 
The French Law on Separation of the Churches and the State of December 9, 1905 is so related into 
historical French culture to the establishment of their famous “Laïcité”, that this law was celebrated 
in 2005 as "Laïcité Centenary", with hundreds of events and festivities in all country. Some myth of 
origins, which remains necessary even in the best democracies, because it permits populations to 
share a common and valuable history, is doubtless at work in this celebration of French Laïcité 
Centenary, commemorating Law of 1905. Myths have goals, but they do not have power of law 
neither are they real texts. Law of 1905 is one step to a slow legal building of French Laïcité.  One 
decisive among steps, but other steps have more recently and more deeply, specified and integrated 
into French Constitution this term of Laïcité (article I, Constitution of 1958).  They interpreted also 
Separation, as one way to organize relations between worships and State in France, when other rules 
exist on the territory, like those in place in Alsace. The constitutional principle which characterizes 
French State is less "separation" than neutrality, a term much more significant. Neutrality can include 
principle of separation, i.e. lack of  public worships service according to the terms of article II of the 
law of 1905 ( no more recognized official worship, no more religion directly related to State with 
public budget for clergy salaries and administrative expenses, no more direct financing of worships). 
But the principle of the Separation relating to the law of 1905, remains circumscribed to a simple 
law, which does not work for the entire French territory and has many amendments, including 
financial (1). More importantly, the principle of neutrality never meant that the French State does 
not know religions nor rejects religious fact. On the contrary, neutrality of the French State is a link 
for a balanced relation and serves as a welcomed and necessary counterweight to its absolute 
obligation to respect freedom of conscience, untouchable treasure of each citizen whose State is 
servant, preventing in that way and forever anyone from any compelled religious belief and 
preventing everyone in the same movement from a belief far different from his most intimate 
conviction, this own belief being sacred and unreachable, whatever its contents are and even if its 
contents would be totally atheistic and anti-religious.  
It is more because of this balance that the Law of 1905 should be celebrated: This law only cemented 
the association between neutrality of the State (end of its ‘gallican’ interventionism in life of religions 
and end of its very old relation with catholic Church) and its essential reason, freedom of conscience. 
It is indeed not so anecdotic to recall that the first words of this law, those of its article I, are as 
follows:  "the Republic shall ensure the freedom of conscience", quite simply because this assertion is 
constitutional today and that, for simple that seems the sentence, underlies a definition which is not 
a definition inherited from French free-thinkers of previous centuries, making freedom of conscience 
as the absolute right of a free will, without religious feeling. On the contrary, freedom of conscience 
in the context of the law of 1905 protects religious beliefs, whereas traditional French freedom of 
conscience had been until this date the right to enlighten consciousness vis a vis religious or political 
obscurantism.  
Therefore, freedom of conscience ensured by the Law of 1905 is not at all what thinkers of the 
French public school system had in mind at the end of the 19th century, when they dreamed of a 
better educated youth, moralistic indeed, but certainly free from religious yoke. When the legislator 
of 1905 uses this formula, he leaned the freedom of conscience in the basket of religious belief.  
Consequently it is this religious direction - more inherited from French Protestant thought against 
catholic Church ‘s power as well as against unique state religion- that one will find in French texts and 
jurisprudences, this imprescriptible right to keep a religious belief which implies life choices and 
conducts. It is this religious direction of freedom of conscience which will be devoted as a 
fundamental principle of constitutional value, by a Constitutional Council Decision of November 23, 
1977, which devotes also and logically freedom of teaching as another fundamental principle.   
However, after having tried in a first part to review the whole implication that the Law of 1905 
impelled in the French Law compared to the freedom of conscience, understood as the religious 
consciousness, we will see that the other French tradition, less legal than philosophical, makes 
conscience as a strengthened place for religious emancipation and the seat of autonomous 
judgement. This sense did not disappeared, neither from the "consciences" nor from the mind of the 
lawyers, and it emerges strongly when it confronts with "the freedom of religious conscience".  Not 
only freedom of "religious" conscience knows many legal limits in France but it is also subordinated 
to the project of a liberated consciousness which crosses French history and thought since 18th 
century. This taste for emancipation compared to religious requirements explains number of 
contemporary restrictions, like the famous  prohibition of Islamic veil wearing in French public 
schools, when the veil as a freedom of religious conscience asserted by some, is considered by others 
as an obvious attack  against "enlightened consciousnesses"...   
I Thanks to the law of 1905, the freedom of conscience applies, above all, to the religious belief in 
French legal system.   
To the first article of the Law of December 9, 1905 which affirms that "the Republic shall ensure the 
freedom of conscience" – as a personal freedom implemented by an additional sentence which 
protects collective dimension of religious practice "It guarantees the free exercise of the worships 
under the only restrictions enacted hereafter in the interest of the law and order" - answers the first 
article of the 1958’s Constitution instituting the Vth French Republic:  "France shall be an indivisible, 
secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, 
without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs ".  We have there as a perfect 
circle which defines the Republic in its constitutional spirit (Laïcité) - if I allow myself to make this 
comparison- as a Trinity:  neutrality, freedom of conscience, equality. The neutrality of the State is 
the first condition of Laïcité and results from the silence of the constitutional text about God or any 
divine principle, contrary to some older Constitutions or constitutional texts .   
The Republic is self-referred, without transcendence at the top. Neutrality of the State imposed by 
the Republic means that the legal State resulting from the Constitution does not have a 
denominational agenda, nor that the common law is founded on some particular religious standards 
nor that any of its powers can claim any religious option. The religious incompetence of the French 
State is understood into consideration of its double task, which is 1) to ensure according to the first 
article of the law of 1905, the freedom of conscience, specified in the first article of the 1958’s 
Constitution, with this assertion that the Republic shall respects all beliefs, and 2) to ensure the 
equality of all citizens before the law without discrimination of origin, race or religion.  To some 
extent, these three conditions of Laïcité as constitutional spirit are entangled, and under its three 
conditions, the freedom of conscience holds an essential place. Indeed, if the French State does not 
have any more religious legitimacy nor does not interfere into the life and organization of religions, 
the freedom of conscience of each citizen obliges it to respect personal believes but also to 
guarantee the free exercise of the worships as collective believes, and to apply the as equally as 
possible its engagement to respect all beliefs without discriminating any, thanks to an equal and 
general law.  The equality of the citizen in the respect of his belief and its worship requires that the 
State, while guaranteeing this right, never gives him any sign of inequality of treatment. The freedom 
of conscience thus implies the principle of neutrality as an absolute obligation of its public services to 
take no part into opinions and believes.  
 
"Neutrality is the common law of all public agents during their office".  It does not mean ignorance of 
religious fact but implies equality between the worships.  If the legislator, in 1905, gave up 
recognized worships, and if the State cannot more recognize any religion as public or official, it never 
shall ignore any. Among the assets of the first article of 1905, of constitutional value, figure the 
assertion that all religions have the right to express themselves - what was not the case before-  and 
as a counterpart of the preceding one, the assertion which there should not be, by one or more of 
them, entanglement with the State or negation of its fundamental principles.  
 
So, if the State does not profess any religion while applying a strict equality between its citizens in its 
public services, that means that users must be treated in the same way however may be their 
religious beliefs. It is necessary and imperative that the administrative services, submitted to political 
power, assure not only whole neutrality but show its neutrality, so that users cannot feel 
discriminated. That is what the Council of State called the “duty of strict neutrality” which is 
obligatory for any public servant (Council of State May 3, 1950, Dlle Jamet and the contentious 
opinion of May 3, 2000 Dlle Marteaux).  Apart from the service, the civil servant is free to express its 
opinions and beliefs, provided this expression do not have effect on the service (Council of State April 
28, 1938 Demoiselle Weiss). During the office, a strictest duty of neutrality is required.  Any 
demonstration of religious convictions during work is prohibited as well as the wearing of religious 
sign - the Islamic veil recently-, even if the servant is not in touch with the public. This requirement 
for neutrality of civil servants is particularly present in the Public Education (Constitutional Council 
Decision, 84-185 of January 18, 1985, Loi Chevènement and Council of State, opinion of May 3, 2000, 
Dlle Marteaux) and in the public Health service (Administrative Court of Paris, October 17, 2002, Mrs. 
Christine E, concerning the respect of the "freedom of conscience" of users in a state of weakness or 
dependence).   
 So long, the freedom of conscience is recognized for civil servants, their personal convictions 
political as well as religious cannot be revealed nor known, and are never registered in their 
candidates’ files (Constitutional Council Decision n° 76-77 of July 15, 1977, Dossiers des 
fonctionnaires), except those made for the choice of a future Prefect by the President of the 
Republic.  The access to concourses is never prohibited due to religious opinion (CE March 13, 1953, 
Tessier).  None public or private employment, according to the Preamble of the 1946’s Constitution, 
subparagraph 5, can be made unreachable because of race, origin or religion. The authorizations of 
absence of public agents for the religious fests are granted each year by ministerial circulars. The 
freedom of conscience is also used as a reason to guarantee the freedom of teaching and to allow 
existence to private and denominational schools.  It is again used to justify that in confessional 
schools, if they are under an official contract with the State and if theirs teachers are salaried by the 
State as previous by the Law Debré of December 31, 1959 (law n°59-1557), religious teaching is not 
obligatory and respects the freedom of conscience of children and parents.  Confessional belonging 
of teachers in denominational private schools under contract with the State is not obligatory, in the 
name of their freedom of conscience, but at the same time, once engaged, they must respect the 
proper character of their establishment, and practise a "duty of reserve" vis-a-vis the expression of 
their own opinions and beliefs, if those differ from the religious culture transmitted there (Cour de 
Cassation, May 19, 1978, Dame Roy c/association Sainte Marthe). Thus, in many catholic schools, 
teachers, administrative staff and children are without religion or of another religion than 
Catholicism, in particular Moslem.   
In the name of the (religious) freedom of conscience, beginning in the French constitutional history 
by the Law of Separation of 1905, it is also prohibited to force a doctor or a medical worker to act 
against his conscience (Constitutional Council Decision n°74-75 of January 15, 1975, about abortion 
right) , neither it is possible to force a patient to follow a treatment or a prescription he refuses . The 
freedom of conscience is also used as a reason for objection of conscience (refusal of using 
weapons), integrated in 1963 in the Code of the National Service (articles L 116 -1 and 116-8) and 
replaced by a specific service, become in 1983 an civil service affected to the Ministry for social 
Affairs.   
II. The freedom of conscience strongly preserves nevertheless in France a value of “liberation” 
which re-appears in the conflicts of conscience and frequently dominates over the requirements of 
the religious conscience.  This manner of seeing the freedom of conscience prevails largely in the 
French education system and explains the strict attitude of the public authority (and of the French 
opinion which shares this way of seeing) with the permissible scopes of the freedom of (religious) 
conscience, as understood by the Law of 1905.   
We have in example, though of course this definition is not legal, the definition proposed on French 
National Assembly official website (www assembly-nationale.fr/site-jeunes/laïcité/fiches-
dates/fiches-1989/fiche.pd), page “Juniors”, page “Laïcité” into a alphabetical list of related terms.  
Freedom of conscience is defined as a "moral autonomy.  It is the right for an individual to determine 
his philosophical, religious, ideological, political convictions (...) apart from any external pressure, 
familial, social or political ".  The religious freedom defined in the same list, is then " the faculty for 
any individual to adhere to a chosen confession or to refuse any (freedom of conscience), but also to 
express and teach its convictions and beliefs (freedom of thought) and to exert his worship publicly, 
according to his faith (freedom of worship)".  These definitions are focused on self-determination 
and personal choice of intimate convictions which suppose a complete autonomy of the personal will 
and can be regarded as an effort against educational, social and cultural pressures around.   
 
So that freedom of conscience is not understood as a freedom which allows, in the name of one 
imperative conscience, minority groups or single believer, to claim their right to exist and to be 
equally protected by a common law or on the contrary, by a specific or genuine law. It is an absolute 
right of the conscience to act without external support, and to find into itself the means of its world 
comprehension.  For those who have read the Discours de la Methode of René Descartes, continuity 
of the Cartesian heritage and French subjective philosophy shines in this understanding of the 
freedom of conscience.  The French conscience is enlightened and independent...   
It is in the name of this enlightened freedom, that the obligation of public servants does not touch 
the academic level.  In a famous decision of January 20, 1984, the Constitutional Council strongly 
reaffirmed that the principle of professorial independence was necessary in the interest of the 
service (DC. 83-135, Loi relative à l’enseignement supérieur).  It validated article 3 of the submitted 
law relating to the higher education (n° 84-52 of 24 January 1984) which stipulates that "the public 
utility of the higher education is secular and independent of any political, economic, religious or 
ideological influence; It tends to the objective knowledge; it respects the diversity of opinions.  It 
must guarantee to the teaching and researches their possibilities of free scientific creative and critical 
development ". The article 54 of the same law stipulates that" the professors-researchers, the 
professors and the researchers enjoy a full independence and a whole freedom of expression in their 
professional performance, under the reserves imposed to them, in accordance with the university 
traditions and the provisions of the present law, the principles of tolerance and objectivity ".  The 
reason of this tradition of extreme confidence, granted to the academic level on which is exerted 
very few control (except cases of genocides revisionism or incitement to racial hate), is of course that 
their "scientific" example will educate French students to free conscience.   
The deep influence which generations of philosophers gave to the French culture explains why the 
education given by the public educational system, provides at the same time the fundamental 
knowledge and a civic spirit, attentive "to open the door" to a critical attitude.  Without debating on 
the sensible bankruptcy of my country’s school system, nor on the mitigated results of its method 
which contributes to whelm the streets with angry people in case of real or imaginary threat on 
social rights and freedoms, this free-conscience-impulse explained the strong French educational 
systems’ and public opinion mobilization against the wearing of the Islamic veil. How to form free 
consciences if some assert such a religious imperative requirement as a freedom?  This difficult 
question was in fact treated in the logic of the French school system.  The teachers and teaching 
contents’ neutrality regarding religion must be extended to pupils inside buildings.   
Thus, if any freedom of (religious) conscience is recognized by pupils, it is not stricto sensu written in 
the last text of educational Orientation (Loi d’orientation 89-486 of July 10, 1989 ), but should take 
part in the freedom of expression, expressly recognized by pupils in this law (article 10). Nevertheless 
this freedom of expression is strictly framed, and to some extent undervalued by the legal minority 
of pupils. The obligatory character of the public Education and the principle of the obligatory 
assiduity of pupils make for example obstacle that for pupils ask for a systematic short or daily 
exemption of assiduity for religious reasons.  Only specific authorizations of absences are allowed. 
Public holidays of the school calendar are indeed often catholic religious ferial days, related to 
catholic historical heritage of the French population.  The texts specify that these authorizations can 
only be granted "in exceptional circumstances and for certain particular days insofar as they 
correspond to holy days, fitting in a calendar established at the national level and as they do disturb 
the continuity of schooling" (CE, Ass, April 14, 1995, Consistoire Central des Israélites de France, 
Circulaire of December 12, 1989 of the Minister for national Education).  
 
By the same manner, respect of a time dedicated to religious teaching during the schools’ week is 
obligatory in the public education, but out of the school building for the primary education level (Law 
of March 28, 1882) and the respect of the food religious rules in the school canteens is a 
recommended tolerance, though limited to another meat or protein substitute in case of pork meat, 
but it is not a legal obligations of the public restoration service.   
The opinion of the Council of State of November 27, 1989, is very revealing on the freedom of 
conscience of pupils, because this highest jurisdiction, guardian of the "religious" tradition of the 
freedom of conscience, as it was built starting from the Law of 1905, could not ignore its existence. 
Questioned by the government about the compatibility of the wearing of religious signs with the 
principle of laïcité, the Council of State indicated:  "It results from the above that, in teaching 
establishments, the wearing by students of symbols by which they intend to manifest their religious 
affiliation is not by itself incompatible with the principle of laïcité, as it constitutes the free exercise 
of freedom of expression and of manifestation of religious creeds".  In its opinion, the Council of 
State initially recalled the distinction between the obligations made to the personnel and those to 
the pupils. Indeed, "it results from the constitutional and legislative texts and from the international 
engagements of France that the principle of the laïcité of the public education, which is one of the 
elements of the States’ Laïcité and of the public services systems’ neutrality, imposes that teaching is 
dispended in the respect of this neutrality by programs and teachers and in addition in respect of the 
freedom of conscience of the pupils".  Concerning the pupils, the principle of Laïcité not only 
“prohibits [... ] any discrimination in the access to the teaching which would be founded on the pupils 
religious convictions or beliefs " but also " the freedom thus recognized included for them the right 
to express and to manifest their religious beliefs inside the teaching establishments."   
However the Council of State specified immediate limits of this freedom:  ", but that this freedom 
should not allow students to sport signs of religious affiliation that, due to their nature, or the 
conditions in which they are worn individually or collectively, or due to their ostentatious and 
provocative character, would constitute an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, 
or would harm the dignity or the freedom of the student or other members of the educative 
community, or would compromise their health or safety, or would perturb the educational activities 
or the education role of the teaching personnel, or would trouble public order in the establishment 
or the normal functioning of the public service ".  
In the same way the exercise of the freedom of conscience must be limited "insofar as (it) made 
obstacle to the achievement of the missions reserved by the legislator for educational public service, 
which must, in addition to allowing acquisition by children of cultural and professional background as 
well as sense of responsibility as (wo)men and citizen, contribute to the development of their 
personality, inculcate to them respect of individuals, origins and differences, guarantee and support 
equality between men and women".   
After this opinion, Lionel Jospin, then Minister for the national Education, spread a Circular, on 
December 12, 1989 declaring that "Laïcité as the constitutional principle of the French Republic, is 
one of the fundaments of the public school.  At school, like elsewhere, religious beliefs of each one 
are a question of individual conscience and thus belongs to freedom.  But at school where all young 
people live together without any discrimination, the exercise of the freedom of conscience, in the 
respect of the pluralism and the neutrality of public service, imposes that the entire educational 
community lives safe from any ideological or religious pressure ".  By doing this, if "" any young must 
be respected in his personality - this respect being an integral part of the educational role of the 
school - the young  must learn and understand that the respect of the freedom of conscience of 
others demands his own personal reserve".   
Thus, administrative Justice examined particular cases basing on this official declaration like, since 
1994, on the ministerial circular of François Bayrou, then Minister for national Education.  This one 
established a distinction between discrete signs (allowed), expressing the personal attachment of 
pupils to personal convictions, and the conspicuous signs (prohibited), constituting in themselves 
elements of proselytism or discrimination. The Council of State, through its jurisprudence, cancelled 
several internal rules of teaching establishments, which prohibited in a general and absolute way the 
wearing of any distinctive sign.  In the same way, it cancelled decisions of pupils exclusions.  On the 
other hand, The Council of State admitted the legality of sanctions if justified by a disorder with the 
law and order, and in particular when girls refused to remove their scarf during sport lessons or to 
take part in others lessons for religious reasons.  In these cases, the refuse, opposite with the 
obligation of assiduity exceeds their right to express their religious convictions.   
This jurisprudence however showed its limits. On the one hand, the legal conduct retained by the 
opinion of the Council of State was discussed since their application could appear very different from 
one establishment to another.  In addition, decisions made by heads of teaching establishments were 
difficult to do:  difficulties of interpret what was conspicuous or not, difficulties of application, when 
parties refused dialogue.  These difficulties leaded in a large part the reflection preceding to the Law 
n° 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, framing, in accordance to the principle of laïcité, the wearing of signs 
or clothes expressing a religious affiliation at elementary schools, schools and colleges. 
 
 
